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ANNOUNCER: In our editorial today we shall be dealing with Rumania's position in the Middle East crisis within the framework of international policy.

NARRATOR: The very day Ceausescu and Maurer returned to Bucharest after having attended the meeting in Moscow of the West European regime leaders, a communique was issued by the Party Central Committee on the situation in the Middle East.

It would be enough to read the text of this declaration signed by 7 Communist states (but not by Rumania) to discover without any difficulty the real meaning of the Moscow Meeting and of the document it issued. Russia is anxious to perform a certain role in the troubledMiddle East, as well as to exercise the strongest possible influence on the policy of those countries and to interfere in their internal problems. Behind a phraseology no longer able to deceive anyone, hidden behind a solidarity imposed upon their East European allies, Brezhnev and Kosygin continue the old tsarist expansionism with the same zeal.

The Bucharest declaration is inspired by quite a different principle. The difference results not only from a disproportion of potential, but from another vision of human society.

Russia chose the Arab world to be the instrument of her Middle East policy. The Moscow document asserts that it fully backs the Arab thesis in the Middle East conflict with Israel, condemns without any proof the so-called Israeli aggression, demands condemnation of the tiny state of Israel by the General Assembly of the UN, and warns that the socialist countries "will do all they believe to be necessary to help the Arab nations reject the aggressor and if Israel does not stop its action of aggression and withdraw its troops to a line existing before the outbreak of hostilities.

Even if this declaration arrives after the end of the war and may thus have in the eyes of the Arabs only the meaning of a gesture of consolation, it will not facilitate

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a peace settlement, but on the contrary.

The Bucharest declaration does not condemn Israel as an aggressor. It asserts that in order to liquidate the consequences of the hostilities and to solve all the problems existing in the Middle East, it is necessary that the parties involved start negotiations to find the corresponding solutions with a view of establishing a lasting peace. And here the document appears to be rather vague. It is not quite clear if by "the parties involved" only Arabs and Israelis are meant, or other powers too. It is probably so worded deliberately, in order that the terms may be unspecified, either to maintain unchanged the position of neutrality adopted in the conflict between Israelis and Arabs, or to keep open the possibility of another formula of negotiations.

The interests of all the Middle East nations as well as of general peace, the document continues, demand that relations of collaboration should exist between the countries of this region, that there should be no interference in the problems of other countries, and that a solution be adopted which is able to set up the perspectives of peaceful coexistence among these countries. This passage from the Bucharest declaration is evidence that the Rumanian regime's preference would be in favor of direct negotiations between the Israelis and Arabs. Such a preference appears to be quite logical and in accordance with its foreign policy, which asserts the principle of non-interference in the internal problems of other states. This formula does not exclude the possibility of such negotiatons taking place under the auspices of the U.N. or another international forum offering enough guarantees of impartiality.

However, beyond this special case, the Rumanian declaration also includes three very valuable points. The utilization of armed force must not be the necessary means for the solution of various problems under dispute. It is an old principle indeed, and proclaimed by all but disregarded by many claiming that the use of force is required by the so-called policy of national egoism. Communism usually employs force as an instrument of its foreign policy, but first and foremost in its relations with its own citizens. You may ask why we allot a certain importance to a principle in foreign policy which the Rumanian regime is always violating in its relations with its own citizens? Our answer is the following: this could represent a beginning of a changing attitude vis-a-vis its own citizens! And second, such an attitude justified by two other confessions of faith included in the June 11 declaration. Indeed, the latter asserts quite clearly the necessity of negotiations as a method of resolving differences and disputes. The third

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point which the Bucharest document supports is international collaboration. These three points can be deciphered in the reading of the Bucharest declaration. Their application to the present international conditions would have been even clearer if they had not been veiled in such stereotype communist language.

However, let us just mention the fact that the Rumanian regime's policy appears to be willing to approach the world by trying, willy-nilly, to return to the policy followed by Nicolas Titulescu. We would not like to believe that this broadening of perspectives in Rumania's foreign policy is only in relation with Corneliu Manescu's election to the post of Chairman of the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly. It would be useful if this insistently proclaimed policy of renouncement of the employment of force in foreign policy were also adopted in our country's internal policy.

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